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Public verification

Check what was signed, without taking our word for it.

Anyone can verify a document sealed here — the parties, their lawyers, a collecting society, or the other side in a dispute. The whole point of the evidence we produce is that it does not depend on us being trustworthy or still being in business.

Check an evidence bundle

Drop a .json evidence bundle here

or

The file is read in your browser and is never uploaded. You can confirm that by disconnecting from the network before dropping it — this page will still work.

Check a document against a quoted hash

If someone has given you a hash and a document separately, paste both. The canonical text must be pasted exactly as it appears in the bundle’s canonical field — one line, no reformatting.

Doing this without this page

  1. 01Take the `document.canonical` string exactly as it appears in this file, with no reformatting, and compute its SHA-256 digest. It must equal `document.hash`.
  2. 02Check that every entry in `signatures[].documentHash` equals that same value. A signature quoting a different hash was made against a different version of the document.
  3. 03Walk `audit` from the first entry. Entry 1's `prevHash` is sixty-four zeros; every later entry's `prevHash` must equal the previous entry's `entryHash`.
  4. 04For each audit entry, canonicalise the object {seq, at, actor, action, detail, payloadHash, prevHash} with keys sorted alphabetically and no whitespace, then take SHA-256. It must equal that entry's `entryHash`.
  5. 05Any standard tool will do this. On macOS or Linux: `printf '%s' "<canonical>" | shasum -a 256`. No software from TGC is required at any step.

What a verified bundle does not establish

  • This establishes what was recorded and that it has not been altered since. It does not establish that the named person was physically at the keyboard.
  • Identity assurance is recorded as it stood at the moment of signing and is never upgraded retrospectively. A signature made at 'email verified' remains an email-verified signature however well identified that person is today.
  • Timestamps are from TGC's own clock unless a `trustedTimestamp` block is present on a signature. Where it is absent, the time is our assertion, not an independent authority's.
  • The chained log makes a silent edit detectable by anyone holding an earlier copy of a hash. It does not make an edit impossible, because TGC holds the log. Bundles issued to the parties at signing are the counterweight, which is why they are issued.
  • This is evidence, not an adjudication. It does not determine whether the underlying agreement is valid, fair, or enforceable in any particular jurisdiction.

Tkeyz Global Concepts. TGC is not a party to the agreements sealed here, holds no funds under them, and takes no position on their merits.